Aronoff, A. I.
ergence of per-
inger.
oral develop-
in old educa-
, 709–720.
overwrought
& R. L. Och-
politics of self-
ven, CT: Yale

) we read fic-
58.
.ing of mind:
a, H. Tager-
Inderstanding
(pp. 10–39).

tive. means to

olic commu-
urnal of Per-

Jsing motive
r of an indi-
urnal of Per-

:riences: Evi-
explicit mo-
:veryday life.
ichology, 68,

Chapter 20

Personality and Motivation: Personal Action and the Conative Evolution

<div align="right">

Brian R. Little

Carleton University

</div>

A fundamental change has been evolving in how personality psychologists think about human motivation. The sources of this change are diverse and its implications are far-reaching. It is an evolution in the constructs deemed central to understanding human lives, the methodological probes through which such constructs are appraised and the practical implications for how we conceive of human flourishing. The shift has been away from seeing either unconscious motives or contextual forces as the overriding influences on motivational life and, more contentiously, away from seeing motivation solely through the prism of a restrictive cognitive theory. The shift has been *toward* the study of intentional personal action. It explores what people are trying to do in their daily pursuits, their engagement in personal projects and life tasks, and the commitments with which they struggle in their lives. In short, we have witnessed a "conative evolution" in personality psychology.[1]

I wish to trace the roots of this change, selectively appraise its empirical yield, and discuss its implications both for personality psychology and for the social and life sciences more broadly. Relative to other treatments of this topic this chapter highlights a crucial but relatively neglected element of the conative evolu-

tion: the development of new criteria for fundamental measurement and assessment in personality psychology.

At the outset, I wish to delimit the scope of the chapter and declare my own biases. I believe that the conative evolution is the most significant change that has occurred at the intersection of personality and motivational psychology over the past two decades, but it is clearly not the only change. Also, the conative evolution has not been restricted just to personality psychology. Similar changes can be discerned in developmental, social, and cognitive psychology. Some of the relevant research in these areas will be incorporated selectively into my review.

PERSONAL ACTION AND CONATION: A BRIEF CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Projects in Waiting: Lunchtime at the Schwedische Café

Imagine it is 1927 and we are having lunch at the Schwedische Café across the plaza from the Psychological Institute of the University of Berlin. We are watching Paul, the waiter, who seems

rather preoccupied today. As regular customers who just happen to be psychologists, we try to figure out what is going on. Initially we adopt the behaviorist stance that has become popular in America recently and simply note the observable behaviors that he is engaged in: serving customers, speaking to the chef about an overdone steak, blinking frequently, interacting with Kurt and Bluma in the corner, running across the square to an art gallery where he receives an envelope from a woman. What has Paul been up to?

We could speculate on the contingencies that are controlling his behavior and the drives that are being reduced as he completes his various tasks. But as longtime customers, we have a vested interest in understanding Paul's action in a more personal sense. We might make some reasonable guesses about his conduct. Although he has been going through the routine actions of a waiter, he seems rather tense and is now off on a break, perhaps getting information on a potential purchase at the gallery. Beyond that we have little to go on. But assume we see him in the square after lunch and say, "Hey Paul, what's up? How are you doing?," adding that he seemed rather distracted that day. Paul answers that he has been "finishing up my job at the Schwedische Café." He confirms that serving customers was indeed part of his routine activities as a waiter, but he explains that his frequent blinking wasn't a nervous tick but an intentional act. He also tells us that his talking to Kurt and Bluma had been rather exasperating.[2] He did not go to the gallery to purchase a print but to get a cheque from his aunt, the owner of the shop, which would allow him to pay for a boat ticket to America. Now that arrangements had been made, Paul was all set to embark on his life's core project of "being a musician" in New York City.

This imaginary scenario illustrates a number of key aspects of motivation and personality as viewed through the lens of personal action. First, much of Paul's behavior could only be understood by soliciting his own account of the personal action in which he was engaged. His serving of customers was routine activity requiring little by way of explication or subtle motivational analysis. His repeated blinking is more complex. Normally we think of blinking as reflex behavior designed to keep the eye lubricated or, as in this case, as a sign of emotional tension. But upon direct questioning he informs us that his blinking is a rehabilitative task designed by his occupational therapist to stabilize his visual

field after an ear fenestration operation.[3] Such behavior constitutes intentional action with personal consequences. In short, Paul's behavior that noon hour makes sense only to the extent that we understand what has been *personally salient* to Paul that lunchtime.

Second, the scenario was played out in a particular restaurant in Berlin during the 1920s. The scene unfolds during the period of the Weimar Republic when many people (including Kurt and some of his students in the corner) were watching with alarm the rise of Nazism and planning the possibilities of emigration. And while the '20s were still very much roaring in New York, economic disaster was looming. Personal action is embedded in such contextual elements.[4] In addition, not all of the projects that Paul was engaged in would necessarily have been communicated and yet would have an impact on his ecosystem. Indeed, he may hesitate to even think about, let alone communicate about the impact of the choices he is making at this point in his life. For example, his project of leaving for America has effectively ended his three-year romantic relationship with Gerda. Clearly not all of the contextual features of personal action can be specified: Considerable winnowing is required. But there can be little doubt that a reasonable understanding of what Paul has been up to requires the most important features of his social ecology to come into view. In short, personal action assessment needs to be *contextually sensitive*.

Third, Paul was not engaged in just one personal action that lunch hour. Depending upon the level of resolution with which one observes his conduct, he was engaged in dozens of personal actions and several key projects. Two projects were of overarching significance and were systemically linked—his leaving Germany and pursuing his musical career in New York. Some of the projects were in conflict: His exchange with Bluma and Kurt had a temporal conflict with getting the cheque from his aunt before the gallery closed. Also, and this is crucial, these personal actions are not independent of his mood, cognitive processing, and overt behavior but rather are a central and pervasive determinant of them. His seeming obliviousness to his longtime customers was, in this scenario, intricately connected to his need to complete his lunchtime projects and his attention was focused on pursuits that were ongoing rather than completed or off in the distance. His general well-being and sense of excitement were directly linked to the

fact that h
long drea
are *system*
action.

Fourth,
on fixed t
with pers
nature of
possibiliti
his life an
places, ne
in contras
ational fo
ronment,
tential to
reformula
The facts
nificance
possibiliti
lustrate a
units in
fixed feat
potentiall
As Paul p
ment doo
suspects h
relationsh
ality may
but his go
vocation i
fect that e

Paul an
reference
trate som
personalit
Media co
sionally st
will jump
in the 19
come Gai
his project
gles with t
tual broth

**Perspecti
Motivatic**

Etymolog
vation is
the forces
mon goal
ferences ir
ment. Wh
as motivat
choice, by

ation.³ Such
on with per-
il's behavior
o the extent
·rsonally sali-

)ut in a par-
the 1920s.
of the Wei-
(including
the corner)
Nazism and
:ation. And
ı roaring in
oming. Per-
ıtextual ele-
ırojects that
y have been
ı impact on
:ate to even
ɔ about the
t this point
˥leaving for
ree-year ro-
arly not all
| action can
ɪing is re-
ubt that a
ul has been
:tures of his
short, per-
contextually

st one per-
ıding upon
ıe observes
ɔns of per-
. Two pro-
ɔ and were
·many and
˥ork. Some
; exchange
:al conflict
before the
, these per-
his mood,
ıavior but
rminant of
s longtime
:ately con-
lunchtime
·d on pur-
ıpleted or
being and
:ed to the

fact that he was on the verge of pursuing his life-long dream. Disparate psychological processes are *systemically integrated* with ongoing personal action.

Fourth, in contrast with perspectives focusing on fixed traits or unconscious motives, a concern with personal action highlights the contingent nature of daily action and the developmental possibilities of people. Paul is at a crossroads in his life and his choices will launch him into new places, new relationships, and new projects. But, in contrast with fixed traits or the "harder" situational forces immediately present in his environment, Paul's personal action has greater potential to be reconstrued, forestalled, redirected, reformulated, abandoned, shelved or sacrificed. The facts of project pursuit take on added significance in the context of the counterfactual possibilities that are foregone. Such concerns illustrate a distinctive feature of personal action units in personality psychology—they are not fixed features of personality but dynamic and potentially *tractable* aspects of agentic conduct. As Paul posts his "For Rent" sign on his apartment door, he feels he can "do no other." Gerda suspects he could, if he cared enough about their relationship. Paul's musicality and general geniality may be relatively hard-wired propensities, but his goal of giving up everything to pursue his vocation is a volitional decision with a ripple effect that extends well beyond his Berlin walls.

Paul and his projects will serve as a sustained reference point throughout the chapter to illustrate some of the emerging issues in conative personality psychology. We will use the New Media concept of "morphing" figures by occasionally stretching Paul into new identities. He will jump from Berlin in the 1920s to Berkeley in the 1950s without aging a day. Paul will become Gauguin. He will emerge as Pauline and his projects will transform radically as she struggles with the same core projects that her conceptual brother is pursuing.

Perspectives on Paul in Motion: Motivational Theory as Moveable Feast

Etymologically, the root term underlying motivation is "movement," and the discernment of the forces impelling such movement is the common goal of motivational theorists, despite differences in the presumed source of such movement. Whether Paul's lunchtime activity is seen as motivated by unconscious forces or conscious choice, by drive reduction or stimulus seeking,

by infantile needs or current commitments, depends on the particular theoretical vantage point and historical period in 20th-century motivational theory. To illustrate these issues concisely, not only will we morph Paul into relevant contexts, we will adopt another rather surrealistic (or postmodern) device to help advance the narrative. Using the Schwedische restaurant as a home base, we will have Paul's activities observed by different tables of motivational theorists. This will help us illustrate recurring themes as we proceed through classical, critical, and contemporary perspectives on motivation. Some of the tables seem permanently reserved for succeeding generations of like-minded theorists. Others disappear for a generation and then return.⁵ Still others, relegated to the patio for years, simply move their table inside and declare themselves hosts of the feast. This device will also allow us some anachronistic licence in the service of conciseness.

Classical Perspectives: The Roots of Motivation

Consider first a table of psychodynamic theorists. They are deeply interested in the unconscious motivation underlying Paul's action, much of which would have aggressive or sexual roots. They are particularly attuned to detecting the conflict-laden nature of his activities and of the defences he erects against the anxiety caused by such conflict. They are alert to nuances in his conduct that might escape the attention of those viewing him from different vantage points. Through the haze of cigar smoke they pose some distinctive questions.⁶ Why did Paul wait so long before securing the financial assistance from his aunt? Is his abandonment of Gerda a reaction to his own feelings of desertion by his parents who were essentially emotional strangers? Is it significant that the few times his parents expressed emotional warmth was when he performed well in his music recitals?⁷

There is a separate Harvard table at the Schwedische Café with a permanent "Reserved" sign prominently displayed in crimson. It is a long table because not only psychologists but anthropologists, sociologists, and various scholars in the humanities are all offering their versions of Paul's pursuits. At the head of the table sits Henry Murray. Their perspective on Paul is similar to the psychodynamic one, although guided more by a wide-angled Jungian lens than a purely Freudian one. But they also invoke "need" constructs so that Paul's frequent interac-

tions with the Berlin Psychology group may be seen as an indication of a need for affiliation (nAff) and his pursuit of a career in music as due to needs for exhibition (nExh) and achievement (nAch). They comment too on the environmental "press" that allows Paul's needs to be facilitated or frustrated. The Murrayans also see temporal factors as crucial in understanding his daily behavior: The explanation of Paul's motivation should take into account the time-binding, long-term "serials" through which his needs are expressed. The pursuit of his dream of being a musician is a natural analytic unit for these theorists, though such analytic units were primarily conceptual and remained unoperationalized for decades (Little, 1983).

Also sitting at the Harvard table, but a bit off to the side, is Gordon Allport, Murray's contemporary at Harvard. Allport was one of the founders of the modern academic study of personality and a theorist who early and frequently raised the key issue of "what units shall we employ" in the study of motivation and personality (Allport, 1958). Allport voices concerns about the Freudian accounts of Paul's conduct, calling attention instead to the enduring traits that distinguish him as well as the extent to which his goal of becoming a musician represents his deepest (propriate) strivings. In addition, he reminds his colleagues that, although Paul's leaving Berlin may have initially been impelled by unconscious forces, his eventual departure may have become functionally autonomous of its original motivation. It would be propitious, suggests Allport, for us to ask Paul himself to explain the motivational concerns that lead him to undertake his trip abroad.

To this last point, vigorous nods of approval would most certainly come from George Kelly, and his personal construct theorists, sitting at what appears to be a patio table moved inside by passing construction workers. Kelly (1955) promoted a credulous approach to personality assessment, one in which the Pauls of this world were assumed to have privileged status with respect to the reasons for their actions. Indeed, Kelly's whole iconoclastic stance was captured at the beginning of his address to the prestigious Nebraska Symposium on Motivation in 1962, in which he declared that he had no use for the concept of motivation whatsoever.[8] His reason was that people are in motion from the very start: Movement is a constituent aspect of the human condition. Paul does not need to be loaded up with either the prods of unconscious

stimulations or the seductive incentives of learning theory to get himself to America. He is pursuing a path laid out for him by the personal constructs through which he sees the world and which provide channels for movement. This view stands in direct contrast with those perspectives that see choice distorted by irrational forces. Those at the Kellian table, a surprising number of whom have British accents, see the invoking of either unconscious or externally manipulated forces to "motivate" Paul as setting up smoke screens that obscure a clear picture of human motivation. With respect to explanatory transparency, the Kellians clearly sit in the "No Smoking" section of the Schwedische restaurant.

Two other groups are lurking about. Looking down on the proceedings from the rafters are a group of Barkerian ecological psychologists (Barker, 1968). This perspective, although obscuring the distinctive motivational features of the individuals below, does reveal a powerful source of motivation—the behavior setting itself, which can coerce us to act "restaurant" rather than "rodeo" or "funeral." And to complete the assemblage, we spot a disputatum of analytic philosophers who have been at the feast for centuries and still feel rather proprietary about explanations of human motivation. They are not watching Paul; they are watching us watching Paul. As walking manifestations of the disposition to think otherwise, philosophers need to be listened to and we will invite them over to our table on several occasions in this chapter.

Do You Have Reservations?: The Cognitive Incursion at Midcentury

During the late 1950s, psychology was having major reservations about traditional motivational theory and its emphasis on drive reduction. White (1959), in an influential review, proposed that a more fundamental motivational principle than the seeking of reduced stimulation was competency and its motivational counterpart of "effectance." The demise of drive reduction theory was coterminous with the rise of cognitive psychology as the dominant influence in psychology. Certainly if entry into the restaurant during the 1950s were based on a group's influence on the emerging cognitive psychology of the day, a number of the groups we have been discussing would have found it difficult to get a table. Orthodox psychodynamic theorists, classical learning theorists, and trait theorists would

have beer
others (b
psycholog
their tabl
garded as
bit far ou
right in is
tion, part
whose inf
plied rese
nitive rev
continuit
rary peri
1996).

In the
shift with
competer
traditiona
during th
theory be
psychody
nence to
flict free"
object rel
lenged by
actionism
Mischel,
arrival of
café, who
discussing

*Contemp
of Motiva*

Imagine 1
tually the
contempc
observing
ally the sa
patrons a
the Schwe
reserved f
there is o
other wit
chapter. 1
lied arour
second ai
sonal acti
(Little, 19

Like th
both the
start their
outward a
ers in the
Buss and

:s of learn-
He is pur-
e personal
world and
ient. This
those per-
· irrational
surprising
ts, see the
:rnally ma-
setting up
:ure of hu-
xplanatory
n the "No
restaurant.
t. Looking
ifters are a
rchologists
iough ob-
:eatures of
powerful
setting it-
·estaurant"
1 to com-
utatum of
it the feast
iroprietary
:ion. They
itching us
ons of the
ilosophers
ivite them
ns in this

ive

·as having
l motiva-
ive reduc-
:view, pro-
itivational
1 stimula-
inal coun-
f drive re-
the rise of
influence
:he restau-
a group's
sychology
have been
lt to get a
.sts, classi-
sts would

have been turned away. The Kellians, seen by others (but not themselves) as proto-cognitive psychologists, would have been allowed to keep their table, though one senses they were still regarded as "patio people"—interesting folks but a bit far out. One group who would be ushered right in is those following in the Murrayan tradition, particularly McClelland and his colleagues, whose influential program of theoretical and applied research on motivation withstood the cognitive revolution and provided a needed line of continuity between the classical and contemporary periods of motivational theory (Winter, 1996).

In the ensuing decade there was a substantial shift within psychology toward more cognitive, competency-focused perspectives. Some of the traditional perspectives became "cognitivized" during the 1960s and early 1970s. Thus learning theory became cognitive social learning theory; psychodynamic theory accorded greater prominence to Hartmann's earlier concept of a "conflict free" ego sphere and focused increasingly on object relations. Orthodox trait theory was challenged by a dynamic person–environment interactionism (Argyle & Little, 1972; Endler, 1983; Mischel, 1968). The scene was now set for the arrival of a van load of new customers for the café, who quickly took to their tables and began discussing Paul.

Contemporary Perspectives: The Routes of Motivation

Imagine now a contemporary restaurant on virtually the same site as the Schwedische Café.[9] A contemporary group of psychologists has been observing Paul who has been engaging in virtually the same acts as his predecessor. Some of the patrons are direct descendants of the group at the Schwedische Café and have kept their tables reserved for the better part of the century.[10] But there is one group we need to visit with and another with which we will spend the rest of this chapter. The first are trait theorists who have rallied around Big Five units (e.g., John, 1990); the second are conative theorists who study "personal action constructs" (hereafter PAC units) (Little, 1989).

Like their predecessors of seven decades ago, both the trait and the conative psychologists start their explanatory ventures by observing the outward and visible behaviours of Paul and others in the café. However, following the lead of Buss and Craik (1983) we will now refer to these

as *acts* rather than behaviors, a subtle but important difference affording a greater possibility for convergence among theoretically disparate positions in personality psychology (Little, 1987). Imagine we are watching Paul deal with the customer who is "sending back his overcooked steak." Buss and Craik (1983) invoked precisely this example in a seminal article that, among other things, clarified the difference between trait and motive accounts of observed acts. The trait psychologist may see this act as a highly prototypical exemplar of a trait of "dominance." Were a large number of such acts, relative to appropriate norms, to be observed, the trait concept of "dominance" could be ascribed to this person. Alternatively, this act could be seen as the means through which the person carries out a personal project of "impressing the boss" (Buss & Craik, 1983). Personal projects are prime examples of PAC units. Such constructs serve as "carrier units" for motivation and are at the heart of the emerging conative perspectives in personality psychology.

PACs have emerged in the past 20 years as viable alternatives to other analytic units in the field of personality psychology. They include such constructs as current concerns (Klinger, 1975), personal projects (Little, 1983, 1993), life tasks (Cantor, 1990), and personal strivings (Emmons, 1986).[11] It is helpful to consider the PAC units along an internal–external spectrum in which some are *primarily* regulated by internal factors and others by external forces. Current concerns and personal strivings are relatively more "internal" PAC units, life tasks are more external, and personal projects lie in the middle of the PAC spectrum (Little, 1998).

Paul's conduct displays examples of each of these analytic units. His preoccupation with his trip to New York and its interference with some of his cognitive activities (such as his inattentiveness) reflects Klinger's (1975) conception of "current concerns." A current concern is a state of having a particular unmet goal. Current concerns sensitize us to cues associated with those personal goals in ways that create the idiosyncratic richness of mental life. As Klinger argues, current concerns create the highly adaptive ability of a person to be distracted. For example, Paul may be distracted from his conversation with Bluma because of the directive influence of his more pressing concern of getting his cheque from his aunt. In contrast with earlier views that would predict that Paul's fantasy life would reflect aggressive and sexual themes, Klinger's

research suggests that his dreams, both night and day versions, will reflect the current concerns in which he is still engaged.

Paul's action also exemplifies Emmons's concept of a "personal striving" (Emmons, 1986). Personal strivings are goals or pursuits that individuals are *typically* trying to pursue. Several of Paul's sets of actions might be subsumed under the personal striving of "trying not to be influenced unduly by others." This is not a one-off activity or a singular pursuit but a representation of a relatively enduring idiosyncratic motive that undergirds diverse activities.

Personal projects are conceptually situated at the juncture point between the internal and external ends of the PAC spectrum (Little, 1972, 1983). Personal projects are extended sets of personally salient action. Projects have inner representation as aspirations and goals, but they also have an external manifestation as observable acts that are impacted by and impact upon the social ecology. Projects can leave imprints and residues. Paul's project to "leave for America" serves both as a source of motivation for him and as a source of deep concern for Gerda. Moreover, appraisals of this project in the Berlin of the 1920s in comparison with the 1990s would reveal social ecological differences that are central to explaining motivated action.[12]

That cultural, societal, and other systemic sources of influence may prescribe or proscribe our pursuits is also seen clearly in Cantor's construct of "life tasks" (Cantor, 1990). Cantor sees life tasks as age-graded, normatively shaped pursuits that individuals in particular settings are likely to be engaged in, even though they may pursue these common tasks in idiosyncratic ways. For example, a contemporary Paul may be working at the restaurant part time while also attending the university. And at the university he is expected to be engaging in various tasks that would include "getting independent of parents," "finding a career," "performing well academically," and "forming intimate attachments," tasks that his student counterparts in Bologna and Berkeley are also likely to be engaged in. Paul's actual work at the restaurant may be in the service of remaining relatively independent of his parents' support (though not his aunt's), and his musical vocation may be, at least in part, a key aspect of his resolution of the normatively graded life task of achieving a vocational identity.

Another closely related analytic unit, Markus's concept of "possible selves," can also be seen as a key element of the motivational dynamics of Paul's personal action (Markus & Nurius, 1986). A possible self is a representation of both desired and feared future selves that serve to motivate action and commitments. Both the 1920s Paul and his 1990s counterpart may have had images of themselves in New York, perhaps receiving a standing ovation in Carnegie Hall, and both may have worried that the recurring ear problem may be a warning sign of an incipient fatal disease.

It is important to emphasize that each of these examples of the new generation of motivational units has a dynamic and contingent nature to it compared with traditional motivational units. Concerns and strivings may be accomplished or abandoned; projects and tasks may be reconstrued as meaningless or may provide the ground structure for a life's course. These units, in short, provide access to both the "stasis and flow" of human lives (Pervin, 1983).

Introductions to these units and reviews of the research stimulated by them is now extensive (Cantor & Zirkel, 1990; Emmons, 1998; Little, 1998, in press-b,c,d; Austin & Vancouver, 1996). However, one key aspect of PAC units has received very little attention: the measurement and methodological assumptions underlying PAC unit research. I believe that it is these assumptions that have made a distinctive conative psychology viable and will examine them in detail in this chapter. Because personal projects analysis was among the first systematic methodological frameworks to be developed for conative assessment and because it served as the basis for some of the other PAC units, I will adopt the project language for much of what follows. Where appropriate, however, other PAC units will also be invoked.

FOUNDATIONS OF PAC UNIT ASSESSMENT: METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES, MEASUREMENT CRITERIA, AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Methodological Procedures

Studies using PAC units have evolved a general set of methodological procedures that, although not rigidly standardized, have typically involved four basic steps.

1. Individuals generate a set of PACs (goals, projects, strivings, etc.) expressed in their own terms. Both written and oral lists have

been generated, and typically 10 to 15 PACs are elicited.

2. Respondents rate each PAC (or subset of those generated) on appraisal dimensions selected on the basis of theoretical or practical relevance to the particular study.

3. Respondents provide information on where and with whom projects are undertaken and complete modules that locate the elicited PACs within a hierarchy of more superordinate and subordinate constructs. They also complete matrices showing the impact of PACs on each other within the individuals' own system and upon those of other relevant individuals.

4. Issues relating to PAC change are appraised, such as resistance to change, factors currently impeding and facilitating progress, and changes that might be undertaken to improve functioning in the overall system.

These procedural steps, either individually or in combination, bring into focus each of the conceptual issues that we discussed earlier as comprising essential attributes of personal action: personal saliency, ecological sensitivity, systemic integration, and tractability. We can now address these more formally as measurement criteria for PAC assessment.

Measurement Criteria

Personally Salient Units

If we wish to ascribe valid predicates to people about their motivations, it is essential that we give them the chance to provide us with information that is personally salient to them. At the outset PAC assessment adopts the Kellian credulous approach and in this respect differs from other assessment perspectives, such as orthodox trait assessment.

PAC assessment techniques are not unique in providing the opportunity for personally salient information to be conveyed. Open-ended narrative methods, free association, and projective tests also provide an opportunity for individuals to reveal salient information without the constraints of orthodox testing formats. However, PAC methods are distinctive in providing a crucial "winnowing" function in personality methodology. By generating a sampling of the analytic units themselves, phrased in idiosyncratic language, PAC methods maintain subjective saliency, but in manageable "packets" of information

that provide natural units for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. From the innumerable set of subjective concerns, discriminated stimuli, construable objects, and quotidian events within which lives are constructed, PAC elicitation procedures ensure that a workable subset of typically a dozen or so salient projects, tasks, goals, or concerns are generated. Just as personal construct theory differed from general cognitive theory by generating a few distinctive constructs that characterized a given person, PAC units allow us to say of a given individual *"here* are her major life tasks" or *"these* are his core personal projects."[13] It is this person-centered aspect of PAC unit assessment that makes it distinctively a form of personality assessment as well as providing the potential for more general motivational assessment.

Ecologically Sensitive Assessment

This criterion requires that the assessment of personal action provide access to important contextual features. PAC units accomplish this by providing information on the spatial and temporal contexts of action and by using modular assessment so that appraisal dimensions of particular significance to people in specific social ecologies can be selectively integrated into the assessment process.

Sensitivity to the spatial contexts of personal action is afforded by several aspects of PAC methodology. Ecological features may emerge in the elicitation phase, when individuals list their ongoing concerns and projects (e.g., "Find a better daycare center for my daughter"). The spatial context can also be framed in terms of the places within which projects are enacted (Little, 1983). Personal projects analysis (PPA), for example, often uses an "open column" that allows individuals to specify the particular places within which each of their projects are primarily enacted, from which various spatial indices can be calculated.[14] In the appraisal matrix it is possible to obtain ratings on the impact of environmental features on individual's pursuits. For example it has been shown that an important determinant of job satisfaction is the extent to which individuals perceive each of their projects as impeded or facilitated by the organizational climate of their workplace (Phillips, Little, & Goodine, 1996, 1997).

Given our assumption that much of human motivation takes the form of sets of action that serve as carrier units for parcels of motivation,

we need to be sensitive to the temporal ecology as well as the social ecology that frame and limit their enactment. Early studies examined the ratio of the actual time spent on projects to the time desired (Palys & Little, 1983), and more recent studies have looked at issues such as whether individuals have sufficient time for their projects, the urgency entailed, and the extent to which they procrastinate (Pychyl & Little, 1998). From the beginning of research on personal projects, the elucidation of temporal stages through which they progress (inception, planning, action, and termination) was a defining aspect of the construct (Little, 1983). Indeed, personal projects analysis was developed, in part, to operationalize the temporal units, such as "serials," that were a central tenet of Murrayan theory.[15] In a detailed analysis of the personal projects of doctoral students, Pychyl (1995) found that procrastination and other temporal pressures were pervasive features of student life. Although it is possible to look at procrastinatory tendencies as trait-like dispositions, to directly assess the process of temporizing we need to sample the ongoing, temporally extended (and extended, and extended . . .) sets of activities that people pursue and sometimes never complete.

Modular flexibility in PAC units means that researchers interested in studying personality and motivation in distinctive eco-settings can create new, ecologically representative appraisal dimensions.[16] The modular flexibility also extends to being able to "provide" common projects or tasks that characterize a particular group (e.g., "watching your weight" in a study of eating disorders (Goodine, 1986)).[17] The call for modular flexibility in goal assessment respects the need for ecologically appropriate units and appraisal dimensions and requires ingenuity and sensitivity on behalf of the researcher/assessor. Clearly, as a generalized methodology for the elicitation, appraisal, and systemic measurement of the motivational doings in a person's life, PAC unit appraisal is far more like a MANOVA than an MMPI.

Systemically Integrative Measurement

From its modern inception, personality psychology has had a strong commitment to providing an integrative core to the diverse specialties within psychology. However, this integrative aspiration has often been compromised by the methodological approaches that have dominated

the field over the past 6 decades (e.g., Carlson, 1971). PAC methodology attempts to meet the integrative challenge in several ways.

PAC units comprise hierarchically organized personal systems (Little, 1983; Pervin, 1983), and their measurement is most appropriately examined at the individual level of analysis.[18] PAC units are typically viewed as "middle level units" that allow investigators to examine different sets of systemic influence. Within a single person's project system, for example, each project is systemically related to three different contexts. First, each project may be linked tightly or loosely with superordinate and subordinate analytic units (Little, 1983).[19] Second, each project can be linked with the other ongoing projects in that person's system, and we can study the extent to which an individual's system is one of congruent, mutually supportive pursuits or of pervasive internal conflict. This is assessed by cross-impact matrices in which each project is rated in terms of its positive or negative impact on other projects within the system (Little, 1983).[20] Third, project systems do not exist as self-contained individualistic fiefdoms, but impact for better or for worse on the projects and tasks of other individuals. This too can be examined by the use of *joint* cross-impact matrices, where two individuals examine the impact of each others' projects on their own (Little, 1983). Paul, for example, may have a high degree of internal coherence in his own project system, whereas the joint cross-impact analysis with Gerda may reveal major conflicts.[21]

Another way in which PAC assessment is integrative is that it is not restricted to assessing personality in one domain only (e.g., exclusively cognitive).[22] Projects, tasks, and strivings can all be studied in terms of their affective, cognitive, and behavioral aspects by adopting the conative unit as an embarkation point and directly soliciting information in the other domains.

Tractable Units

The analytic units used in conative assessment are tractable in the sense that, unlike fixed traits or the immutable features of our environment, they are dynamic features of personality that have the potential to be modified. Three aspects of this tractability deserve emphasis.

First, the use of tractable units of analysis in personality research affords the opportunity for therapeutic or personal development activities to be centered directly on the units that have been

assessed.[23] goal, or se for clinica ties. It is t ity of PAC tractive tc therapy (: 1998) ani Little, & tempts tha project sy commoda provided l therapeuti sabotage. developm hance the projects, being ser which th 1998).

Second from the appraisal (level data possible tc to allow fi cial ecolog tervention above, it i between a the single tween any and contro jects for e lished rese years has i a column (that is, m are treatec dimension

A key is is the exte tween indi tive level s issue, Gee dence of personal p ual and jo implicatio tively stro forth betw analyses w use of cas Paul) serve

., Carlson,
) meet the

organized
in, 1983),
>riately ex-
rsis.[18] PAC
evel units"
ferent sets
le person's
ject is sys-
contexts.
tightly or
linate ana-
ch project
projects in
the extent
of congru-
f pervasive
>ss-impact
d in terms
other pro-
).[20] Third,
tained in-
better or
other indi-
the use of
individu-
s' projects
example,
1erence in
>int cross-
eal major

2nt is inte-
2ssing per-
xclusively
1gs can all
cognitive,
2 conative
tly solicit-

ssessment
ixed traits
ironment,
ality that
ee aspects

nalysis in
tunity for
2tivities to
1ave been

assessed.[23] The problematic core project, life goal, or set of tasks can serve as the direct focus for clinical, counseling, or development activities. It is this practical accessibility and mutability of PAC units that make them particularly attractive to applied fields, such as occupational therapy (see Christiansen, Little, & Backman, 1998) and organizational psychology (Phillips, Little, & Goodine, 1997). Also, influence attempts that are enacted without awareness of the project system within which they must be accommodated are likely to be resisted. Awareness provided by PAC units might help forestall both therapeutic noncompliance and organizational sabotage. They can also be the direct targets of developmental activities in which individuals enhance the meaning and support of their personal projects, particularly their core projects, while being sensitive to the social ecology within which those projects are embedded (Little, 1998).

Second, PAC assessment has been designed from the outset as a methodology for the joint appraisal of both individual level and normative level data (Little, 1983; Krahé, 1992). It is also possible to expand normative level information to allow for interventions at the level of the social ecology. Each of these levels of potential intervention deserves comment. As alluded to above, it is possible to examine the relationship between any set of appraisal dimensions within the single case (e.g., we can run correlations between any two project dimensions, such as stress and control, across each of the 10 personal projects for each individual). But most of the published research using PAC units over the past 20 years has involved normative analyses, in which a column mean on appraised project dimensions (that is, mean level stress and mean level control) are treated as vectors just as we would use trait dimensions.[24]

A key issue, from a measurement perspective, is the extent to which there is isomorphism between individual level project spaces and normative level spaces.[25] In an extensive analysis of this issue, Gee (1998) has provided very strong evidence of convergence between the underlying personal project spaces measured at the individual and joint or normative levels. One practical implication of this finding is that there is relatively strong justification for moving back and forth between individual and normative levels of analyses with PAC units. It also means that the use of case studies (or of invoking figures like Paul) serve more than ornamental purposes.

The question of whether individual or normative levels of measurement deserve primacy in the research strategies of personality psychologists remains contentious (Krahé, 1992). My own view is that both levels are necessary for a comprehensive and integrative personality psychology but that the individual level assessment takes precedence in programmatic research. Individual level assessment provides what philosophers refer to as "thick" rather than "thin" accounts of action—it samples the singular and specific components and contexts of a particular person's action. But the fact that these idiosyncratic motivational "packets" of PAC units can be rendered commensurable by the use of common appraisal dimensions and other indices that provide for normative measurement means that both of our historically important approaches to personality can be preserved. By inductively aggregating individuals showing similar patterns at the individual level into relatively homogeneous clusters, it is possible to make broader generalizations at the normative level.

The third distinctive aspect of PAC methods relates to the status of the information that has been generated and its use beyond ascribing personal predicates to individuals. We have described this as the "social indicator potential" of data gathered with PAC units (Little, 1989). By storing data on the specific content and appraisals of personal projects and associated demographic characteristics of the individuals who are pursuing them, it is possible to shift the interventional focus from the individual person level up to the level of the social ecology within which that individual pursues defining projects.[26] By encouraging the analysis of information gathered at the level of groups or eco-settings, PAC units have been used to address issues in public policy analysis (Phillips, Little, & Goodine, 1996, 1997), epidemiology (Ewart, 1991) and political philosophy (Little, 1998, in press-c). They not only afford us images of the individuals and their contexts but, by being tractable, also allow us to improve the quality of lives by intervention at both the level of the individual and the social ecology (Little, 1996).

A Research Framework for Conative Personality Psychology

Taken together, the foundational measurement criteria provide the base for what has emerged as a research framework within which most of the current conative personality psychology is car-

A **Personal Features** (e.g. Traits, temperament)	C **Personal Action Constructs** • Current Concerns • Personal Strivings • Personal Projects • Life Tasks	**PAC Dimensions** Meaning Structure Community Efficacy Stress **PAC Content** e.g. Abstract/ concrete % Intrapersonal	D **Quality of Life** • Subjective Well-being • Happiness • Mental and Physical Health • Eco-setting Competencies and Domain Satisfaction • Adaptation • Sense of Meaning and Coherence
B **Contextual Features** (e.g. Cultural differences, organizational climate, etc.)			

FIGURE 20.1. A social ecological model of personality.

ried out. As depicted in Figure 20.1, there are four major blocks of research variables that constitute this approach to personality. Moving from right to left, Block D represents the major outcome or quasi-dependent variables used in conative personality research related to human adaptation and well-being. Essentially these measures assess well-being broadly defined so as to include measures of subjective well-being (and its affective opposites, such as depression or anxiety), life satisfaction, and ecological competency (Sundberg, 1980), which is the ability to adapt successfully in different eco-settings, such as academia (e.g., as indexed by GPA) or work settings (e.g., as indexed by performance ratings). Increasingly, physical health outcome measures are also being adopted in conative personality psychology (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 1998).

Box C represents the different PAC units that are the focus of this chapter. Typically a vector of scores is derived from these measures involving mean scores calculated across the elicited PACs on dimensions such as importance, enjoyment, perceived control, and stress. These scores can be analyzed either ipsatively or normatively. In addition categorical measures are often used, such as the frequency with which different types of projects, tasks, or strivings are mentioned in the free elicitation phase of the assessment process or

the level of molarity or abstraction of goals (e.g., Little, 1987; Emmons, 1992).

Boxes A and B refer to person and environmental/ecological features that can have both direct and indirect (via PAC units) effects on well-being and adaptational measures in Box D. For clarity and simplicity, the effects in the flow model that are of particular importance in this chapter are drawn with bold arrows. Reciprocal effect of PAC unit variables upon well-being and adaptation is a core assumption of the model, as is the reciprocal effect of PAC variables on measures of traits and of environments. There is also considerable research activity going on within the block of PAC variables, particularly relating to the relationship among different dimensions of appraisal, such as commitment and perceived progress or a sense of meaning and control. Some of these will be discussed below.[27]

CONATIVE PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY: THEMES AND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

Much of the empirical research in conative personality psychology has been concerned with identifying the relationships between appraisal dimensions of PAC units and their relationship

with other blocks of variables in Figure 20.1. We first discuss different stages of project and action pursuit. We then discuss five factors that underlie PAC ratings, with an emphasis on the prediction of well-being. Finally, we examine recent studies pitting PAC unit explanations against alternative theoretical constructs (such as trait and contextual models), which, together, make a strong case for the distinctive strengths of this approach to personality and motivation.

Action Stages and Project Pursuit

In the original article on personal projects, considerable attention was devoted to the temporal stages (and substages) through which projects can proceed en route from the original hint of their possibility to their eventual completion, sustained effectiveness, or demise (Little, 1983). We will use the major stages of inception, planning, action, and termination to help organize a growing literature on action phases and project pursuit. Adopting a temporal perspective allows us to see the unfolding of diverse influences that impact on project pursuit. Even more important, from the perspective of contemporary personality psychology, it allows us to bring into focus motivational issues that have, in recent years, receded in influence within personality psychology because of the demise of motivational features that occurred during the cognitive revolution. The full spectrum of motivational factors can, in theory and increasingly in practice, be brought into common focus by the adoption of PAC units, particularly when viewed in temporal perspective. Because much of this literature overlaps with self-regulatory models discussed elsewhere in this volume (see Carver & Scheier, Chapter 22), I will place particular emphasis upon distinctive issues raised by the integrative potential of PAC units in personality psychology.

Project Inception

The inception phase of personal projects extends from the discernment of the possibility of a course of personal action through to a commitment to undertake it. It is at this stage that the most extensive array of influences occur, ranging from unconscious forces impelling people away from or toward a particular project, through traits that can "attune" them to systemic and ecological constraints and resources.

With respect to unconscious influences, Baldwin, Carrell, and Lopez (1990) have shown that

when graduate students are considering how well they are likely to do in their upcoming term's research projects, they appraise them as less likely to succeed if they had been exposed to a tachistoscopic image of the face of a threatening senior professor, in contrast with exposure to the more benign countenance of a postdoctoral fellow. Such priming schema may cause a person to foreclose on a particular project or at least to exclude it from active consideration. Paul may *never have embarked on a musical career if an* image of his music teacher's pained expression silently suggested he was more appalling than appealing. The growing evidence that these cues may be tacit or unconscious provides a nice line of continuity between the classical psychodynamic theorists of motivation and contemporary conative theorists.

The trait dimension of Openness to Experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992) has an interesting relationship to the inception state of personal projects. It is the only Big Five trait dimension that is consistently related to the tendency to engage in a diversity of personal projects, but it has little relationship with the appraisal of projects once they have passed through into the planing and action stages (Little, Lecci, & Watkinson, 1992).

Social ecological factors influence whether a person will even consider the possibility of pursuing a particular project or task. At different stages of the life cycle, different types of personal project or life task becoming normatively salient (Cantor, 1990). Sanctions, ranging from mild censure to outrage, can ensue from a person undertaking nonnormative tasks and from not engaging in those that are prescribed as appropriate. For example, Helson, Mitchell, and Moane (1984) have described the operation of "social clock projects" in which women, in particular, are expected to entrain their pursuits to a particular socially defined timetable. This was especially so with the cohort of women who came of age during the 1950s, where the social expectations of engaging in educational, marriage, and motherhood projects, in that order, held considerable sway over the types of goals that women would even consider. Their projects were both prescribed and proscribed by their social ecology. In Berlin there was still the remnants of the *Kinder, Kirche, Küche* (children, church and kitchen) *constraints upon women, while even in* Berkeley, the normative expectations were that bright, well-educated women would end up living lives more like Harriet Nelson (at least her

TV persona) than Harriet Beecher Stowe. Even contemporary women at the most senior levels in public and private sector management show considerably greater sensitivity to contextual influences than do their equally high-status male colleagues. In a study that measured the degree of linkage between personal project appraisals and appraisals of organizational climate, there was a considerably higher degree of project–context linkage for women than for men (Phillips, Little, & Goodine, 1996, 1997).

It will be helpful here if we morph Paul into his conceptual twin, Pauline, and see what the research literature suggests with respect to *her* approach to the inception stage of a personal project to pursue a career as a musician. Unconscious "voices" might have been heard, particularly in the early decades of the 20th century, warning against the unseemly nature of such pursuits for respectable women. In the 1920s, even if Pauline were dispositionally "open" enough to pursue a musical career on another continent, there would be structural features that would have made her task a more onerous venture than that of her brother. She would almost certainly not have had a job as a waitress at that particular café in the 1920s if she were also going to university, though the pictures we have of the contemporary restaurant suggest that there are certainly women servers in that restaurant today. Nor is it likely that her aunt would have offered the financial means to pursue that particular dream when the expectation was that she should be seriously considering settling down and being fecund. Paul, conversely, might be given greater latitude to sow his wild muesli while practising his music. The perils of Pauline's project pursuit would thus entail both the subtle tyrannies of introjected voices and the stony hard constraints of economic opportunity. But the essential aspect of this stage of project pursuit is that these influences are not so much weighed and agonized over, but that they are tacit injunctions about what one can even *consider* undertaking.

Project Planning

If a project survives the first major stage of inception, either by an implicit or explicit statement of commitment to pursue it, *then* the agonizing can begin as the task of planning the project becomes paramount. Unlike the previous stage, where goal pursuit might be precluded before it is ever ruminated over, this stage involves explicit concerns about whether to engage in the pursuit and if so, how it will be implemented. One of the most important programs of research in conative psychology has been undertaken in large part by German scholars on the factors that are operating with respect to the planning of action (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990).[28] One key distinction here is between different "mindsets" that one might entertain with respect to a given goal or project and that can be studied as experimentally induced sets or as individual differences measures.[29] Gollwitzer distinguishes between deliberative versus implemental mindsets. Deliberative mindsets involve careful weighing of the pros and cons of undertaking a particular project. Gollwitzer has demonstrated that the deliberative mindset is associated with open-minded processing of information and leads to a more realistic appraisal of the likely project path (Gollwitzer, 1990; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Contrastingly, an implemental mindset is one in which the individual is explicitly focused on the actions necessary to achieve the goal of the project. This set leads individuals to scan cues in a more self-serving way, shields them from information that may distract them from the goal, and fosters illusory optimism about the likelihood of successful completion of the project (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, in press; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995; cf. Norem, 1989).

Consider another Paul, the artist Gauguin, with a similar decision: Should he abandon his family in Paris and pursue his artistic projects in Tahiti? Williams (1981), using a somewhat fictionalized version of Gauguin's story, raises some intriguing questions about the nature of such decisions. Williams's concern is a philosophical one.[30] He invokes the seemingly oxymoronic concept of "moral luck" to indicate the dilemmas of project commitment, particularly commitment to "ground projects" without which our lives may not be seen as worth living. In essence he argues that only to the extent that Gauguin's artistic project turns out successfully could there be any justification for leaving his family. Yet the success of his project was radically contingent upon luck, of fashion, of health, of finances, and all the vagaries that attend our doings in the real world (cf. Bandura, 1982). Contemporary research on motivation and personality add another complexity to Williams's richly textured analysis of project pursuit. At different stages of those pursuits our ability to foresee the likelihood of success realistically may be undermined. It is particularly in the postcommitment

stage that b
jects with u
suit of his c
very nature
diates to tl
downstrear

Project Acti

This stage
the effortfi
ticular proj
to persist i
tance. In
clearly the
adaptive h
distraction
cues are ne
distorted ir
tion necess

An inte
somewhat
mentation
and other i
"life tasks."
strategies
help advar
of a task: c
optimism (
sive pessin
that motiv
sory glow
case scenar
ing image
ingly, eac
serve to ke
task chugg
gests that
some costs
ness of oth

The suc
of a persor
effort. The
of Deci a
dence that
and persist
which the
nates fror
rather thar
nal deman
propose a
nally mot
chosen, se
completely
ate categc

gage in the
plemented.
of research
lertaken in
factors that
ning of ac-
key distinc-
dsets" that
given goal
experimen-
differences
etween de-
ets. Delib-
ning of the
icular pro-
t the delib-
en-minded
to a more
oject path
zer, 1995).
et is one in
used on the
of the pro-
n cues in a
rom infor-
the goal,
the likeli-
he project
Taylor &

Gauguin,
andon his
projects in
newhat fic-
aises some
of such de-
ilosophical
xymoronic
the dilem-
larly com-
out which
ing. In es-
xtent that
uccessfully
eaving his
as radically
health, of
nd our do-
82). Con-
l personal-
ms's richly
t different
foresee the
be under-
nmitment

stage that both Pauls may view their artistic projects with undue optimism. For one Paul the pursuit of his core project ended up transforming the very nature of modern art, and its impact still radiates to this day. Who knows what will be the downstream impact of our other Paul's pursuits?

Project Action

This stage is where the individual is engaged in the effortful activity necessary to achieve a particular project and the ability to motivate oneself to persist in the project assumes central importance. In terms of Gollwitzer's mindsets, it is clearly the implemental one that will be most adaptive here.[31] Through implemental goggles, distractions are ignored, peripheral discordant cues are not processed, and self-conceptions are distorted in such a way as to increase the motivation necessary to muddle through.

An interesting variant on the desirability of somewhat self-distorting images and the implementation of tasks has been provided by Norem and other researchers using Cantor's construct of "life tasks." These researchers have identified two strategies that can be adopted strategically to help advance a person through the action stage of a task: defensive pessimism and illusory glow optimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986). The defensive pessimist constructs a worse case scenario that motivates through fear of failure. The illusory glow optimist, contrastingly, creates a best case scenario and uses this positive and reinforcing image as a motivational resource. Interestingly, each strategy works equally well. Both serve to keep the action phase of the project or task chugging along, though the evidence suggests that the defensive pessimist may incur some costs in terms of decreasing the supportiveness of others around her.

The successful resolution of the action stage of a personal goal or project requires sustained effort. The influential self-determination theory of Deci and Ryan (1991) provides strong evidence that a central determinant of such effort and persistence in project pursuit is the extent to which the individual feels that the project emanates from internal, autonomous processes rather than being simply compliant with external demands or unwelcomed inner urges. They propose a continuum of internally versus externally motivated pursuits, ranging from freely chosen, self-initiated pursuits to those that are completely externally regulated. Two intermediate categories are "identified" regulation, in

which the pursuits, although not being initiated by the individual, are affirmed and valued, and "introjected" regulation, in which there is lack of full identification and the main pressures for continuance are fear and guilt. There is increasing evidence that the more internal the regulatory nature of tasks and long-term goals (i.e., the more internal and identified rather than external or introjected), the greater is persistence and eventual performance effectiveness. In a major prospective study of high school dropouts, for example, Vallerand and his colleagues (Vallerand, 1997; Vallerand, Fortier, & Guay, 1997) have provided strong evidence that individuals most at risk for dropping out are characterized by very low profiles of self-directed autonomy.

There are several excellent examples of recent research demonstrating that PAC units can operationalize and test motivational models related to the management of action (Sheldon & Kasser, 1998; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997). For example, when PAC units are elicited from students and categorized according to the four-point continuum of internally to externally regulated action, it was found that although high levels of external inducement on personal projects predicted initial effort *intentions*, it did not predict *actual* effort several weeks later. Autonomous goals, on the other hand, were associated both with initial intentions and with actual effort during the later, action stages of their projects (see Sheldon & Elliot, 1999, for a summary and integrative model of these studies).

How might Paul's projects be understood in the light of the research on the action stage of project pursuit? Our scenario suggests that his "musical" project may have been more autonomous than was his "interpersonal" one. The latter may have been sustained more by assuaging guilt than sustaining Gerda. His way of expressing this, were he to have filled out a project listing just before leaving Germany, may have been "try not to hurt Gerda too much." There is compelling evidence that the prevalence of such "avoidance" projects in one's project system may incur physical health costs (Elliot & Sheldon, 1998).[32] Paul's recurring earache may be as integral to the complexities of his project pursuit as is Gerda's heartache.

Project Termination

Some projects never end. Interminable projects, such as "treasuring my children" may take differ-

ent forms over the years, but as a core defining aspect of self will only perish with that self. Most projects, however, are brought to completion, resulting in feelings of satisfaction ranging from relief to rapture. There is increasing empirical evidence that progress in project pursuit, over time, enhances well-being (Brunstein, 1993; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Relative to the other stages, not much research has been done on project completion, though it involves some of the most subtle aspects of daily human motivation. Klinger (1977) provides a compelling picture of some of the motivational issues surrounding disengagement from a goal, or "current concern." He argues that when a valued goal or current concern becomes frustrated or when it begins to lose incentive value, a predictable cycle will ensue. First, there is an invigoration of effort, then a more aggressive and primitive level of responding, then a downswing into depression, and later, an upswing into recovery (Klinger, 1977). Thus when he began to realize that his relationship with Gerda was not intrinsically rewarding for him, he may have engaged in a frenetic attempt to reinvest in the relationship, increasing the time he spent with her and composing and dedicating a piece of music to her (perhaps a fugue?). Subsequently, he might have gone through a period of barely suppressed hostility. Finally, when it is clear that he no longer loves her, Paul is likely to feel apathetic and even depressed. But as he lies in bed mulling over the mess his life is in, his thoughts turn again to New York—his new current concern and core project—and his mood begins to lift.

Personal Action and Well-Being: The Happiness of Pursuit

The rise of a conative personality psychology has been accompanied by increased research interest in subjective well-being, happiness, and perceived quality of life. In contrast with an earlier emphasis in personality psychology on maladaptation and psychopathology, contemporary research is increasingly concerned with factors that underlie human flourishing. For example, much of the early and continuing research with PAC units (Palys & Little, 1983; Emmons, 1986) has focused upon the prediction of subjective well-being (SWB) (Diener, 1984). The central notion underlying current PAC perspectives on well-being is that human happiness and quality of life is intimately related to the content and appraisal of one's ongoing pursuits.

Content Analyses of PAC Units

Content measures are typically taken from the elicitation phase of PAC assessment and involve examination of both the various domains (e.g., interpersonal, health, recreational) that individuals are involved in and theoretically important categorical variables, such as the level of molarity (Little, 1989) or abstractness (Emmons, 1998) of projects and strivings. Consider, for example, "intrapersonal projects," those concerned with changing or exploring aspects of one's personality (e.g., "being less shy," "figure out why I am so excited when Kurt is around"). Several studies have shown that the frequency of such intrapersonal projects in an individual's project system is inversely related to well-being, particularly to measures of depressive affect (Little, 1989; Salmela-Aro, 1992; Salmela-Aro & Nurmi,1996).[33]

PAC Appraisal Dimensions: A Five-Factor Model of Well-Being

The various appraisal dimensions that have been used in PAC research can be theoretically subsumed under five theoretical factors of meaning, structure, community, efficacy, and stress.

The *meaning* dimensions in PAC research address the question of how subjectively worthwhile are the pursuits engaged in by individuals. For example, personal project appraisal dimensions include having people indicate how enjoyable, important, and value congruent their projects are, and how expressive they are of their sense of personal identity (Little, 1989).[34] To the extent that the overall level of meaning in a person's project system is high, we anticipate that well-being will be enhanced; contrastingly, we anticipate that negative affect will be higher in individuals whose projects are essentially meaningless (Little, 1989).

Although having meaningful projects has been consistently associated with higher well-being, it will be shown later that meaningful projects are not sufficient in themselves to ensure high levels of well-being. This is because no matter how worthwhile one's projects might be, they may lack a sense of coherence and therefore be difficult to manage. We address this by including a set of dimensions relating to project *structure*—such as whether an individual initiated her projects, has a sense of control over them, and has sufficient time to devote to the them. There is clear empirical evidence that dimensions such as

perceived c
cantly relat
health (Litt
jects most l
not necessa
deed, we su
manageabili
are caught
achievable i
A person
ingful and r
nificance or
als. Given
(e.g., norma
portance of
and facilitat
community
broad sense
ported. A p
be blocked
one may lea
whole doma
bel, "Don't
units, such a
primarily be
as normativ
ecologies."
is typically
families evei
pursuit for :
taged by w.
tasks to be s
the microco
acted. But r
well hidden.
ings may b
though well
extent that
that are higl
to others, a
clear whethi
the effects
(Ruehlman
One of th
ing well-beii
feel their pi
likely to cor
factor of "ef
meaningful,
if it is expeci
be comprom
cacy of ongc
is one of the
erature (Litt
1996; Wilso

en from the
and involve
)mains (e.g.,
that indi-
cally impor-
the level of
:tness (Em-
;s. Consider,
:cts," those
ring aspects
ss shy," "fig-
1en Kurt is
wn that the
ojects in an
:ly related to
s of depres-
), 1992; Sal-

actor

at have been
etically sub-
of meaning,
:tress.
research ad-
ively worth-
individuals.
aisal dimen-
: how enjoy-
1t their pro-
are of their
39).[34] To the
ing in a per-
ticipate that
astingly, we
)e higher in
tially mean-

)rojects has
her well-be-
ningful pro-
:s to ensure
use no mat-
ight be, they
therefore be
)y including
t *structure*—
ted her pro-
:m, and has
m. There is
:ions such as

perceived control over one's projects are significantly related to measures of well-being and health (Little, 1989; Wilson, 1990). The projects most likely to offer a sense of structure are not necessarily those that are meaningful. Indeed, we suggest that people often experience a manageability–meaning trade-off in which they are caught between impossible dreams and achievable inconsequentialities.

A person's pursuits may be personally meaningful and manageable yet be accorded little significance or value by other significant individuals. Given the social origin of many pursuits (e.g., normatively valued life tasks) and the importance of having the larger eco-setting support and facilitate projects, we refer to this as a set of *community* dimensions, using the term in the broad sense of being socially valued and supported. A person's most treasured projects may be blocked by others, forcefully or artfully. Or one may learn at a very early age that there is a whole domain of pursuits that come with the label, "Don't even think about it." Some PAC units, such as life tasks, are of conceptual interest primarily because they are accorded significance as normative expectations within various "social ecologies." Thus, "achieving well academically" is typically a goal shared by students and their families even though the specific aspects of task pursuit for a given student may be subtly sabotaged by well-meaning others. For projects or tasks to be supported, they need to be known by the microcommunity within which they are enacted. But many individuals keep their projects well hidden, and even their most cherished strivings may be known only to themselves. Although well-being appears to be enhanced to the extent that individuals are engaged in projects that are high on visibility, perceived importance to others, and support by others, it is not yet clear whether this influences well-being beyond the effects of project meaning and structure (Ruehlman & Wolchik, 1988).

One of the most important dimensions affecting well-being is the extent to which individuals feel their projects are progressing well and are likely to continue to do so. This is essentially a factor of "efficacy." Even though one may have meaningful, manageable and supported projects, if it is expected that they will fail, well-being will be compromised. The relationship between efficacy of ongoing personal projects and well-being is one of the most robust findings in the PAC literature (Little, 1989; Salmela-Aro & Nurmi, 1996; Wilson, 1990).

The fifth core dimension of PAC units is that of *stress*, and, like efficacy, it has been found to be a consistently strong predictor (inversely) of well-being (Little, 1989). Stress in one's personal projects is related to Neuroticism and is high in both anxious and depressed individuals (Little, Lecci, & Watkinson, 1992; Lecci, Karoly, Briggs, & Kuhn, 1994). Relatedly, conflict within one's personal strivings (arguably a measure of both lack of structure and of stress) prospectively predict health problems (Emmons & King, 1988).

Although dimensions from each of the five major PAC dimensions is associated with well-being, there are interdimensional interactions that need to be explored. An intriguing example is shown in the work of Lydon and Zanna (1990). They found that the demandingness of volunteer projects enhances commitment and hence may have an indirect salutary influence on well-being. However, this effect only held with projects that were value-congruent (one of the meaning dimensions). Thus, although the five-dimension perspective provides some needed taxonomic structure to PAC units and each serve as predictors of well-being, the subtleties of motivation will be captured more effectively by looking at interactions among the component dimensions. Some important new developments in precisely this more finely textured approach to PAC units and well-being can now be discussed.

Recent Developments with PAC Units: Refining the PAC Well-Being Model

In recent years several conceptual and methodological advances have been published in the PAC literature illustrating the distinctive strengths of the conative framework for exploring personality and motivation.

One area needing clarification was the relationship between the meaning dimensions of PAC units and global measures of well-being. An apparent paradox appearing in a meta-analytic review of this area was that, of the five major factors, project meaning (with the exception of enjoyment) was the least strongly linked with measures of well-being (Little, 1998). Efficacy and the absence of stress were consistently better predictors of well-being. Two recent studies help explain the apparent paradox that measures of the meaningfulness of pursuit were not the best predictors of overall well-being.

McGregor and Little (1998) showed that it is important to ensure that global well-being measures include components tapping into a sense of

meaning in life in addition to measures of happiness and positive and negative affect (cf. Ryff & Singer, 1998). They showed that efficacy was more associated with the happiness component of well-being, whereas project meaning dimensions were, as originally anticipated, more closely associated with a global sense of living a meaningful life.

A closely related issue has been studied by Sheldon and Kasser (1998; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998) who address the issue of project meaning and efficacy, invoking Deci and Ryan's concept of autonomous action and integrating it with aspects of Rogerian theory about the importance of self-congruence. They show that although efficacy is a significant predictor of well-being, it is particularly so with strivings and projects that are high in autonomous regulation and are self-congruent. Most personal projects generated by individuals are, in an absolute sense, meaningful acts (see Little, 1998, for empirical evidence) and hence autonomously regulated. It makes sense, then, that most of the studies that have examined efficacy or have focused primarily upon efficacy dimensions (e.g., Salmela-Aro, 1992) have found significant links with well-being. However, the fact that project meaning is a significant moderator of this relationship is an important finding.

Issues relating to the longitudinal study of personal projects and well-being have also been studied and provide important information about the likely mechanisms subsuming meaningful goal pursuit and subsequent well-being. Brunstein (1993), with German undergraduates, explored changes in well-being over an academic term. He showed that several project appraisal factors successfully predicted changes in well-being over the term. A particularly crucial role was found for project commitment, a dimension that has also been found to be important in studies of organizational behavior (Phillips, Little, & Goodine, 1996, 1997). Another series of longitudinal studies with Finnish undergraduates (Salmela-Aro, 1992) showed a clear pattern of relationship between project content and appraisal factors and measures of counseling readiness and depressive affect. In a causal path analysis of the relationship between project factors and depressive affect it was shown that there were significant paths from depressive affect to subsequent project appraisal and from project appraisal to depressive affect, though the former effect was notably stronger. This suggest that although dispositional factors may play a key role

in influencing the appraisal of our ongoing personal action, there is still evidence of sufficient bidirectionality of influence that intervention studies to enhance well-being are not ruled out.[35]

A final example of the increasing rigor of design in studies of well-being and PAC units is reported by Fleeson and Cantor (1997). In showing the relationship between life task appraisals and daily affect, they examined carefully the possible confounding effect of environmental/contextual features that could be common to the appraisal of both tasks and current mood. They found that PAC effects, above and beyond environmental factors, influence outcome measures. Together with the Sheldon and Elliot results, this strengthens the claim that PAC units are distinct sources of influence on well-being above and beyond their expected relationship with stable aspects of individual differences or environments.

PERSONALITY AND THE INTEGRATIVE CHALLENGE: CONSILIENCE AND CONATION

The central and distinctive contribution of a conative personality psychology is its providing both conceptual and methodological tools for integration within personality psychology (cf. McAdams, 1995). Given personality psychology's commitment to provide the integrative core for psychological science, it is worth emphasizing, by way of review, how the conative evolution advances the integrative aspirations of our field.

We began by showing that Paul's lunchtime pursuits, as examined from an informed but informal perspective, entailed recognition that his personal action was idiosyncratically construed, contextually embedded, systemically linked, and potentially tractable. We developed these four characteristics, more formally, into essential methodological criteria for the elicitation and empirical exploration of personal action constructs (PAC units). We reviewed how the content and appraisal of personal strivings, personal projects, and life tasks allowed us to explore human motivation in a distinctive and, it would appear, increasingly fruitful fashion. PAC units were proposed as occupying a middle ground between stable aspects of persons, stable aspects of situations, and outcome measures relating to well-being and ecological competency. We

showed h
ral proper
tion shift
the pursu
core factc
structure,
shown to
and to o
model, su
the case v
temporal
nomother
lows for
studies to
nations o
theoretica
At the
conative e
emphasis
tual force
strictive c
need to b
tions adva
that an en
clusionary
that simp
tended se
ally embe
conscious
initiation
culties on
ever, we s
high-prioi
son is cu
point of
When su
ganized, j
futile, PA
chodynan
to help c
the lives o
Similarly,
factors ar
motivatio
sentative i
tory const
tualist toi
focused
analysis.[36]
I sugge
ogy goes l
and that
This issu
whether
goal conc

ongoing per-
of sufficient
intervention
e not ruled

rigor of de-
C units is re-
7). In show-
sk appraisals
ully the pos-
mental/con-
on to the ap-
mood. They
beyond envi-
ne measures.
lliot results,
units are dis-
being above
hip with sta-
: or environ-

ON

bution of a
its providing
cal tools for
chology (cf.
lity psychol-
: integrative
s worth em-
the conative
spirations of

's lunchtime
med but in-
tion that his
y construed,
/ linked, and
d these four
ito essential
citation and
action con-
ow the con-
ngs, personal
) explore hu-
id, it would
l. PAC units
ddle ground
table aspects
ures relating
petency. We

showed how PAC units have important tempo-ral properties and that the dynamics of motivation shift subtly as a function of the stage of the pursuits to which we are committed. Five core factors underlying PAC units—meaning, structure, community, efficacy, and stress, were shown to relate both to subjective well-being and to other aspects of the conative research model, such as stable traits. More importantly, the case was made that the modular flexibility, temporal sensitivity, and mixed idiographic–nomothetic strengths of PAC methodology allows for increasingly complex and informative studies to be carried out in which conative explanations of human conduct are pitted against theoretically plausible alternative perspectives.

At the very outset it was suggested that the conative evolution has been a shift away from an emphasis on unconscious motives and contextual forces and also a movement away from a restrictive cognitive perspective. These points now need to be clarified in the light of the propositions advanced in the chapter. It should be clear that an emphasis on personal action is not an exclusionary perspective in personality but one that simply places primary emphasis upon extended sets of personally meaningful, contextually embedded action. We acknowledge that unconscious forces may play a vital role in the initiation of tasks and projects and in the difficulties one experiences in managing them. However, we see the assessment and analysis of the high-priority personal actions with which a person is currently engaged to be the key starting point of serious investigation in personality. When such action becomes dangerously disorganized, persistently self-defeating, bizarre, and futile, PAC theorists will want to invoke psychodynamic, evolutionary, or other perspectives to help clarify the incoherence experienced in the lives of our respondents and co-investigators. Similarly, though we argue that environmental factors are not overriding influences on daily motivation, our emphasis on ecologically representative measurement means that our explanatory constructs are more likely to have a contextualist tone than personality theories that are focused exclusively on internalized units of analysis.[36]

I suggested that conative personality psychology goes beyond a "restrictive cognitive theory" and that this will be a more contentious point. This issue turns crucially on the question of whether personal action constructs are simply goal concepts. Much of the research reviewed in the chapter can be described as goal research, and the most frequently used PAC units are often referred to as personal goal units. Is there a difference? I believe there is: Goals are the *inception* point of personal action, and they have played an illustrious and increasingly influential role in the psychology of motivation, from early Lewinian theorizing to the considerable resurgence in personality and social psychology documented in Pervin (1989). But action, particularly personal action, extends further into the domain of impactful behavior than do goals and in that respect open up different domains for integration into the core of personality psychology. It is true that goal researchers can monitor the environmental impact and behavioral consequences of goal pursuit, but, to invoke Kellian terms, such concerns are at the edge of the range of convenience of the goal construct. PAC units, such as tasks and projects, have a rather different and complementary focus of convenience, and it tips the balance of theory, assessment, and research into domains that had been lost sight of during the cognitive revolution. Expressive behavior, for example, the distinctive semiswagger of Paul as he clears the tables, seems more accessible if we are talking about project action than the goal undergirding it, and it seems more natural to talk about the transactional nature of persons in context by invoking PAC units than goal units. The effortful activity put into projects, strivings, and tasks, the sheer *physicality* of volitional pursuit aligns PAC units more easily with recent advances in the psychophysiological basis of human flourishing (Ryff & Singer, 1998).[37] To put it tendentiously, goal units are the culmination of cognitive personology; PAC units are the beginning of a conative personology.

The fact that the constructs are intimately linked, as subtle as the difference between Paul's planning and parting, should not obscure the fact that the small shift in perspective provides different sight lines on matters of enduring concern to the study of personality and motivation. For example, PAC units can access each of the theoretical perspectives represented by the revolving tables and evolving constructs we encountered at the Schwedische Café—from needs as conceived in the Murray–McClelland tradition (Omodei & Wearing, 1990), to classical learning theory (Ogilvie & Rose, 1996).

The conative evolution has not been restricted to personality research. There is increasing evidence of a general conative psychology taking

hold in social, developmental, and even cognitive psychology.[38] Certainly the increasing interest in "hot" cognition and the rapid rise of interest in affective processes, emotion, and hedonic psychology (see Chapter 21) suggests that the hegemony of cognition as psychology's central core may be starting to fade.[39] But there is also a subtle difference between affective psychology and conative psychology. The former is concerned with the social, cognitive, and physiological concomitants of emotional experience. But where it is concerned about the nature of "hot" itself, conative psychology is concerned with the question, "Hot about what?"

One of the exciting things about the changes that are occurring in personality and psychology in general as we enter the new millennium is that one detects a sense of convergence, a loosening of exclusionary epistemic sects and a more ecumenical atmosphere among psychological researchers. Indeed, the increasing conciliatory nature of our scientific pursuits has been nicely captured in the titles and messages of two recent publications. Mischel and Shoda (1998) have written about "reconciling" processing dynamic and dispositional views in personality psychology. E. O. Wilson (1998) talks about the increasing sense of "consilience" (literally, a "jumping together") that he detects in the biological sciences. Consilience occurs when findings in one domain are increasingly converging with those in adjacent research domains so that the possibility of a grand synthesis appears more hopeful than ever. More contentiously (as if a Grand Synthesis were not contentious enough!) Wilson argues for consiliency to extend from the life sciences to incorporate the humanities. He is especially hopeful that evolutionary psychology, for example, may provide a viable framework for the study of human ethics (Wilson, 1998).

I suggest that, although evolutionary psychology has considerable claim on our attention both in the sciences and humanities, its focus of convenience, again, is displaced too far away from the "thick" textures of personal action that are the natural foci for a conative psychology. I suspect that the small steps towards interdisciplinary consiliency, particularly in the domains of psychology and ethics, will come through research on the small interdomain linkages that show how individuals pursue their singular projects while respecting those of others. For personality psychology to be part of this integrative effort, it will require concepts, methods, and interventional philosophies capable of bridging the most disparate and potentially conflicting roots of human nature and human conduct. The argument of this chapter has been that such integration will be found in the study of personal action, its volitional dynamics and contextual challenges—in short, in a conative personality psychology.

NOTES

1. Conation derives from the Latin, *conatio* (to try) and historically has been contrasted with cognition and affection.

2. They were asking him if he could recall what each of them had eaten for lunch. He responded that he couldn't because they had already paid half an hour ago and didn't they have better things to do over in the Psychological Institute? Paul (I have been unable to determine his real name) had been, of course, the unwitting instigator of Kurt Lewin and Bluma Zeigarnik's speculations leading to the formulation of the Zeigarnik effect. It held that memory for noncompleted tasks is better than for those completed—a landmark in early motivational research. One of the unintended consequences of his projects in waiting had been that he was committing data.

3. I am indebted to Stephen Toulmin for this example (Toulmin, 1970).

4. Such depictions can be "objective," grounded in consensual judgements about the physical, social, or cultural aspects of a person's context, and they may be viewed from the subjective, idiosyncratic perspective of the individual's *personal context* (Little, in press-a). Personality psychology requires information on both objective and personal contexts or in Murray's terms, alpha and beta press. For more detailed treatment of the ecology of personal action (Little, 1987, in press-b).

5. Compare Craik (1986) who has provided a detailed analysis of the historical trends in methodologies in personality psychology.

6. Sometimes a cigar is merely a metaphor.

7. At this last comment the ears of some of the Behaviorists at the next table perk up and mutterings about it finally being Dollard and Miller time are heard over the clanking of tankards. They are a large and diverse group, conceptually emphatic and noisy. Those arriving early in the century would emphasize that Paul's behavior was explicable in terms of the rewards and punishments operating in the environment and as a result of the power of drive reduction in the maintenance of action. The later arrivals would also suggest that much of Paul's behavior was modeled by his cousin, who had left Germany three years earlier to pursue an academic career in Toronto.

8. He e
of the sym
What's Nex
9. This
Cafe unter
University.
Will Fleeso
(1996, p. 3
out of sigh
fleetingly w
10. Thr
in other ch
cial learnin
Murray–M
psychodyna
by their ta
ing each i
discussion
chologists
and the dis
have spirite
Chapter 2).
11. The
PAC units
similar but
plaining act
similar typ
(1990).
12. For
lin in the 1
ble commit
barriers to
the symboli
multitude o
tional agend
13. In th
as both a pe
urement fra
challenges p
orthodox m
14. For
patients are
centrated in
groups, and
the mean d
versely relat
(see Little, 1
15. Ther
tion to the t
projects and
nature of fi
"moving pic
tation of sut
derived fron
times: Temp

icting roots
t. The argu-
ich integra-
)ersonal ac-
contextual
personality

, *conatio* (to
. with cogni-

d recall what
;ponded that
half an hour
o do over in
been unable
,f course, the
Bluma Zei-
ilation of the
for noncom-
ompleted—a
. One of the
:s in waiting

n for this ex-

:," grounded
ysical, social,
ind they may
atic perspec-
t (Little, in
information
; or in Mur-
iore detailed
ction (Little,

rovided a de-
methodolo-

iphor.
some of the
d mutterings
ller time are
:y are a large
ic and noisy.
ld emphasize
ms of the re-
environment
uction in the
s would also
; modeled by
years earlier

8. He even suggested that they change the name of the symposium to the Nebraska Symposium on What's Next? (Kelly, 1962).

9. This restaurant actually exists as the Opern Cafe unter den Linden and is across from Humboldt University. Thanks to the efforts of Anne Tschida and Will Fleeson, a picture of it can be seen in Winter (1996, p. 36). The theorists I am discussing are just out of sight around the corner but can be glimpsed fleetingly with imaginative peripheral vision.

10. Three of them receive extensive treatment in other chapters of this volume—the cognitive social learning theorists (see Chapters 6 and 7), the Murray–McClelland group (see Chapter 1) and the psychodynamicists (see Chapter 3). We shall pass by their table for now (though we will be revisiting each in later sections). We shall also defer discussion with a voluble table of evolutionary psychologists who clearly have much to say about Paul and the distal provenance of his projects: They too have spirited representation in this handbook (see Chapter 2).

11. These are among the more actively researched PAC units and are useful to focus on as they have similar but subtly different foci of convenience in explaining action. For a more extensive discussion of similar types of construct see Cantor and Zirkel (1990).

12. For example, "leaving for America" from Berlin in the 1920s was a far more onerous and irrevocable commitment than it would likely be today. The barriers to coming and going, the relative costs, and the symbolism it entailed suggests that there were a multitude of idiosyncratic Berlin walls in the motivational agendas of individuals.

13. In this respect PAC methodology can be used as both a person-centered and variable-centered measurement framework and is able to address some of the challenges posed by Carlson (1971) in her critique of orthodox methodologies in personality psychology.

14. For example, it has been shown that anorexic patients are more likely to have personal projects concentrated in a very few places relative to comparison groups, and behavioral geographers have shown that the mean distance between project locations is inversely related to well-being among working women (see Little, 1983).

15. There is an important psychometric implication to the temporal extension and dynamic nature of projects and other PAC units. Unlike the "snapshot" nature of fixed traits, PAC units are conceived of as "moving pictures." This means that there is no expectation of substantial test–retest reliabilities for indices derived from the ratings of projects at two different times: Temporal stability of PAC appraisal units is not

a canonical requirement but an open empirical question. Interestingly, when test–retest analyses have been carried out, project system characteristics are notably high, suggesting that there are relatively stable project spaces underlying appraisals of one's current projects (see Gee, 1998).

16. For example, new dimensions have been added to the standard appraisal matrix to study single parents, patients with eating disorders, Indo-Chinese refugees, type A personalities, and senior corporate executives (Little, 1989).

17. A comprehensive and authoritative anthology of over 200 ad hoc dimensions that have been used in research on distinctive social ecologies or to provide local nuance to a standard dimension is available (Chambers, 1997).

18. PAC methodology provides means for rigorous measurement of variables within the single case. This can be illustrated by considering the difference between systemic and discrete measurement of two important personality constructs relating to motivation: a sense of control and perceived stressfulness. Discrete measurement of these two constructs involves the appraisal of each variable separately with a separate measurement tool (e.g., a locus of control scale and a perceived stress scale). The relation between these measures would be a correlation across subjects between the two discrete measures. *Systemic* measurement of control and stress would be carried out very differently. The analytic unit, such as a personal goal, striving, or project, would serve as the common focus for ratings by individuals of their perceived control and perceived stress. The correlations could be carried out either at the individual or the normative level of analysis. In the former case, it is possible that for one individual there will be a negative correlation between stress and control in her particular system, whereas for another subject there may be a positive correlation. Systemic measurement, in short, allows for the study of the interactions among key motivational and personality variables within the personal action systems of the respondents rather than relying on normative, aggregative levels of analysis, which may, theoretically, provide a very different picture of the relationship.

19. The superordinate constructs may be core values or overarching life plans while the subordinate constructs are typically acts or behavioral sequences through which the PAC units are achieved. The molecular units are frequently accessed by the use of sampling techniques using 'beeper technology' (e.g. Klinger, 1984).

20. Sheldon and Kasser (1995) have referred to these two types of linkage as vertical and horizontal integration, respectively.

21. The philosophers in the cafe would tell us that such a datum provides a rich example of the difference between prudential and ethical concerns in human conduct.

22. A similar case emphasizing the need for integrative assessment has been forcefully argued by Craik (1986), who criticizes the guild-like nature of methodologically like-minded researchers in personality psychology. Craik's concern is the promotion of methodological pluralism and the avoidance of sectarian isolation. My concern is equally with the need to avoid sectarian splits, but it takes a somewhat different route to achieving this. As well as having personality researchers achieving integration by wedding insights gleaned from disparate methodologies, I think we also need to have integrative methodologies. The former strategy places the onus for integration on the assessor. The strategy I am advocating sees the assessment instruments themselves as integrative devices for personality psychology.

23. This contrasts with approaches such as trait measurement, which offer more oblique applicability. Trait measurement, for example, helps clinicians match clients with trait-relevant clinical procedures (e.g., group therapy as more appropriate for extraverted clients) (see Costa & McCrae, 1992). But, given the presumed fixity of personality traits, there is little attempt to directly intervene with them as part of a therapeutic plan.

24. When PAC methods are used in this way, the resulting quantitative indices are subject to some, but not all, of the psychometric constraints to which standard normative measures are held accountable (e.g., internal consistency, test–retest reliability etc.) and generally have held up well under such constraints (Little, 1987; Little, Lecci, & Watkinson, 1992).

25. It should be noted that there is no *necessary* mathematical isomorphism between individual and joint level measurement spaces: The ecological fallacy, the individual difference fallacy, and Simpson's paradox all hold that results between variables measured at one level of a system may not necessarily hold at another level (see Gee, 1998).

26. For example, in our own SEAbank (Social Ecological Assessment data bank) we have stored personal project data from thousands of respondents, preserving their idiosyncratic description of the project, their appraisals, and personality, demographic, and other relevant data on individuals generating the data. Such strings of data can be used as social indicators for relevant groups of populations and helps us pose practical questions relating to the quality of life that go beyond individual level analysis.

27. The model (based on Little, 1987, in press-d) is very similar to a recently proposed model of func-

tionalist psychology (e.g., Snyder, 1993). The convergence between conative assessment in personality psychology and similar developments within social psychology is noteworthy. Although there are some subtle differences between the functionalist and conative perspectives in psychology, there is sufficient overlap to suggest that the conative turn is far from a parochial development in personality psychology.

28. A superb review of the motivational literature that gives due weight to these influences is Heckhausen (1991).

29. The study of "sets" and their impact on action has a long history in psychology. One important but infrequently cited work is that of Leff, who has shown how different cognitive sets can influence environmental experience (Leff, 1976). A comprehensive set of "sets" for a conative psychology has been recently proposed by Karoly (1998).

30. Essentially he is criticizing both Kantian and utilitarian views of moral choice and offering a more radically "personalist" (see Trianovsky, 1990) perspective on ethics.

31. At least, so it would seem from the perspective of the *prudential* management of one's personal set of pursuits (see Haslam & Baron, 1994). However, when we begin to take other individuals and their projects into account, and in so doing enter the domain of ethical theory, things become intriguingly complex, particularly with respect to the tension between project pursuit and the well-being of others (Flanagan, 1991; Lomasky, 1984, 1987; Williams, 1981).

32. Higgins' self-discrepancy theory provides an intriguing explanatory framework for understanding Paul's current choices (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Paul's music and interpersonal projects reflect different self-regulatory foci. Music, for Paul, is a "promotional" goal, oriented to achievement of a delight; "Gerda" is a "prevention" goal, oriented toward fulfilling a duty. Failure of the first may lead Paul to depression; failure on the second, to anxiety. Success with the music would be rapturous; success with the interpersonal obligation would be relief. Given his choices, then, we would have to regard Paul as perplexed.

33. However, there is also some evidence that such projects are *also* associated with measures of creativity (Little, 1989), raising interesting questions about how depressogenic and creative intrapersonal projects differ. One possibility is that autonomously regulated intrapersonal projects (in the Deci & Ryan sense) will be associated with creative acts of self-exploration, whereas externally regulated ones will be associated with depression. Thus, for Gerda, the project "figure out why I get involved with unreliable people" may lead to creative self discovery were she to

. The conver-
n personality
s within so-
ıgh there are
ıctionalist and
re is sufficient
ı is far from a
ychology.
onal literature
ıces is Heck-

pact on action
mportant but
ʾho has shown
ence environ-
prehensive set
been recently

ı Kantian and
ffering a more
990) perspec-

:he perspective
personal set of
Iowever, when
their projects
he domain of
ngly complex,
etween project
anagan, 1991;

y provides an
understanding
-Iiggins, Shah,
. interpersonal
y foci. Music,
ted to achieve-
:ion" goal, ori-
ʾf the first may
:cond, to anxi-
ʾapturous; suc-
ʾould be relief.
to regard Paul

evidence that
:asures of crea-
ing questions
: intrapersonal
autonomously
: Deci & Ryan
acts of self-ex-
i ones will be
;erda, the pro-
vith unreliable
ery were she to

initiate it. But if it came down as a family injunction, it could end up as ruminative worrying about her inability to sustain intimate relationships (see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987).

34. There are a large number of PAC appraisal dimensions that are explicitly concerned with the self, and they have received detailed attention elsewhere (Little, 1993; McGregor & Little, 1998). An intriguing self dimension that has been utilized in goal research has been that of self-completion—the extent to which a course of personal action symbolizes the type of person one wishes to be and the compensatory actions that are engaged in if the original goal is frustrated (see Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). This is a research topic, it should be noted, that also had its original inception in the Lewinian group discussions in the Schwedische Café.

35. Relatedly, an important set of longitudinal studies by Sheldon and Elliot (1999) has provided clear evidence not only for the effectiveness of PAC units in the prediction of well-being but also that the effect is not due to the confounding effect of traits such as Neuroticism.

36. Indeed, Figure 20.1 can be augmented by having PAC unit-relevant subregions of both stable traits ("free traits") and environments ("personal contexts") that also meet the four measurement criteria and provide a conative bridge to a transactional psychology (see Little, in press-b,c).

37. Clearly, the line differentiating goal units and PAC units is a fine one. Pervin (1991), for example, has given a persuasive account of the affective significance of goal units in the context of self-regularity failure.

38. I even detect points of common ground between ethology and conative psychology. It is unlikely we could generate personal projects as such with other animals (though I fantasize about getting the whale's view of Melville's masterpiece beginning with: "Call me Moby"). But the study of extended sets of salient activity and the likely goals underlying them are entirely appropriate aspirations.

39. Though I must point out that 30 years ago at Oxford, Patrick Rabbit offered a lecture course entitled "Uncognitive Psychology"—suggesting he was either in denial or way ahead of his time.

REFERENCES

Allport, G. W. (1958). What units shall we employ? In G. Lindzey (Ed.), *Assessment of human motives* (pp. 239–260). New York: Rinehart.

Argyle, M., & Little, B. R. (1972). Do personality traits apply to social behavior? *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 2,* 1–35.

Austin, J. T., & Vancouver, J. B. (1996). Goal constructs in psychology: Structure, process and content. *Psychological Bulletin, 120,* 338–375.

Baldwin, M. W., Carrell, S. E., & Lopez, D. F. (1990). Priming relationship schemas: My advisor and the pope are watching me from the back of my mind. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26,* 435–454.

Bandura, A. (1982). The psychology of chance encounters and life paths. *American Psychologist, 37,* 747–755.

Barker, R. G. (1968). *Ecological psychology: Concepts and methods for studying the environment of human behavior.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Brunstein, J. C. (1993). Personal goals and subjective well-being: A longitudinal study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,* 1061–1070.

Buss, D. M., & Craik, K. H. (1983). The act frequency approach to personality. *Psychological Review, 90,* 105–125.

Cantor, N. (1990). From thought to behavior: "Having" and "doing" in the study of personality and cognition. *American Psychologist, 45,* 735–750.

Cantor, N., & Zirkel, S. (1990). Personality, cognition, and purposive behavior. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (pp. 135–164). New York: Guilford Press.

Carlson, R. (1971). Where is the person in personality research? *Psychological Bulletin, 75,* 203–219.

Chambers, N. (1997). *Personal projects analysis: The maturation of a multidimensional methodology.* Unpublished manuscript, Social Ecology Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa.

Christiansen, C., Little, B. R., & Backman, C. (1998). Personal projects: A useful concept for occupational therapy. *American Journal of Occupational Therapy.*

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Normal personality assessment in clinical practice: The NEO Personality Inventory. *Psychological Assessment, 4,* 5–13.

Craik, K. H. (1986). Personality research methods: An historical perspective. *Journal of Personality, 54,* 18–51.

Deci, E., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In R. Dienstbier (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 38. Perspectives on motivation* (pp. 237–288). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. *Psychological Bulletin, 23,* 915–927.

Elliot, A. J., & Sheldon, K. M. (1998). Avoidance personal goals and the personality–illness relationship. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,* 1282–1299.

Elliot, A. J., Sheldon, K. M., & Church, M. (1997). Avoidance personal goals and subjective well-being. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23,* 915–927.

Emmons, R. A. (1986). Personal strivings: An approach to personality and subjective well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,* 1058–1068.

Emmons, R. (1992). Abstract versus concrete goals: Personal goals and subjective well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62,* 292–300.

Emmons, R. A. (1998). Motives and life goals. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson & S. Briggs (Eds.), *Handbook of personality psychology* (pp. 485–512). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Emmons, R. A., & King, L. A. (1988). Conflict among personal strivings: Immediate and long-term implications for psychological and physical well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,* 1040–1048.

Endler, N. S. (1983). Interactionism: A personality model, but not yet a theory. In M. M. Page (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 31. Personality: Current theory and research* (pp. 155–200). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Ewart, C. K. (1991). Social action theory for a public health psychology. *American Psychologist, 46,* 931–946.

Flanagan, O. (1991). *Varieties of moral personality: Ethics and psychological realism.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fleeson, W., & Cantor, N. (1995). Goal relevance and the affective experience of daily-life: Ruling out situational explanations. *Motivation and Emotion, 19,* 25–27.

Gee, T. L. (1998). *Individual and joint-level properties of personal project matrices: An exploration of the nature of project spaces.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Carleton University, Ottawa.

Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation and cognition* (Vol. 2, pp. 53–92). New York: Guilford Press.

Gollwitzer, P. M., & Brandstätter, V. (1997). Implementation intentions and effective goal pursuit. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73,* 186–199.

Goodine, L. A. (1986). *Anorexics, bulimics and highly weight preoccupied women: A comparison of personal project systems and personality factors.* Unpublished master's thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa.

Haslam, N., & Baron, J. (1994). Intelligence, personality, and prudence. In R. J. Sternberg & P. Rusgiz, (Eds.), *Personality and intelligence* (pp. 32–58). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Heckhausen, H. (1991). *Motivation and action.* Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Helson, R., Mitchell, V., & Moane, G. (1984). Personality and patterns of adherence and nonadherence to the social clock. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46,* 1079–1095.

Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review, 94,* 319–340.

Higgins, E. T., Shah, J. Y., & Friedman, R. (1997). Emotional responses to goal attainment: Strength of regulatory focus as moderator. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72,* 515–525.

John, O. P. (1990). The Big Five factor taxonomy: Dimensions of personality in the natural language and in questionnaires. In L. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of*

personality: Theory and research (pp. 66–100). New York: Guilford Press.

Karoly, P. (1998). *Intentional mindsets: Goal framing in seven dimensions.* Paper presented at American Psychological Society Annual Meeting (May), Washington, DC.

Kelly, G. A. (1955). *The psychology of personal constructs.* New York: Norton.

Kelly, G. A. (1962). Europe's matrix of decision. *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (Vol. 10). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Klinger, E. (1975). Consequences of commitment to and disengagement from incentives. *Psychological Review, 82,* 223–231.

Klinger, E. (1977). *Meaning and void: Inner experience and the incentives in people's lives.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Klinger, E. (1984). A consciousness-sampling analysis of test anxiety and performance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47,* 1376–1390.

Krahé, B. (1992). *Personal and social psychology: Toward a synthesis.* London: Sage.

Lecci, L., Karoly, P., Briggs, C., & Kuhn, K. (1994). Specificity and generality of motivational components in depression: a personal projects analysis. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103*(2), 404–408.

Leff, H. L. (1978). *Experience, environment and human potentials.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Little, B. R. (1972). Psychological man as scientist, humanist and specialist. *Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 6,* 95–118.

Little, B. R. (1983). Personal projects: A rationale and method for investigation. *Environment and Behaviour, 15*(3), 273–309.

Little, B. R. (1987). Personality and the environment. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), *Handbook of environmental psychology.* New York: Wiley.

Little, B. R. (1989). Personal projects analysis: Trivial pursuits, magnificent obsessions, and the search for coherence. In D. M. Buss & N. Cantor (Eds.), *Personality psychology: Recent trends and emerging issues* (pp. 15–31). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Little, B. R. (1993). Personal projects and the distributed self: Aspects of a conative psychology. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 4, pp. 157–181). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Little, B. R. (1996). Free traits, personal projects and idio-tapes: Three tiers for personality research. *Psychological Inquiry, 8,* 340–344.

Little, B. R. (1998). Personal project pursuit: Dimensions and dynamics of personal meaning. In P. T. P. Wong & P. S. Fry (Eds.), *The human quest for meaning: A handbook of research and clinical applications.* Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Little, B. R. (in press-a). Free traits and personal contexts: Expanding a social ecological model of well-being. In W. B. Walsh, K. H. Craik, & R. H. Price (Eds.). *Person–environment psychology: Models and perspectives* (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Little, B. R
projec
transa(
nami,
tives i
assum[
New Y
Little, B.]
ecolog
In J.]
and sel
life-spa
Little, B. F
ings, d
Halon(
twenty
cholog
Little, B. R
ality a
PAC ι
501–5.
Lomasky, I
tion of
35–55.
Lomasky, L
munity
Lydon, J. E
the fac
Journal
1040–
Markus, H.
can Psy
McAdams,
know a
McGregor,
happin
yoursel
74, 49ζ
Mischel, W
York: V
Mischel, W.
dynami
view of
Murray, H.
York: C
Nolen-Hoel
depress.
tin, 10i
Norem, J. (1
fectiven
45–60)
psycholo
New Yo
Norem, J.]
mism: '
of Persoι
Ogilvie, M.
represeι
proache
63(3), €

;6–100). New

al framing in
American Psy-
(May), Wash-

nal constructs.

decision. *Ne-*
10). Lincoln,

mmitment to
. *Psychological*

ner experience
neapolis, MN:

ing analysis of
! of Personality

logy: Toward a

n, K. (1994).
ional compo-
:ojects analy-
ogy, 103(2),

nt and human
ty Press.
: scientist, hu-
rerimental Re-

rationale and
nt and Behav-

.vironment. In
dbook of envi-
r.
nalysis: Trivial
the search for
or (Eds.), *Per-*
emerging issues
ag.
id the distrib-
logy. In J. Suls
elf(Vol. 4, pp.

l projects and
· research. *Psy-*

rsuit: Dimen-
ing. In P. T. P.
quest for mean-
al applications.

personal con-
nodel of well-
& R. H. Price
y: *Models and*
.rlbaum.

Little, B. R. (in press-b). Persons, contexts, and personal projects: Assumptive themes of a methodological transactionalism. In S. Wapner, J. Demick, H. Minami, & T. Yamamoto (Eds.), *Theoretical perspectives in environment–behavior research: Underlying assumptions, research problems and methodologies.* New York: Plenum Press.

Little, B. R. (in press-c). Personal projects and social ecology: Themes and variations across the life span. In J. Brandstädter & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), *Action and self-development: Theory and research through the life-span.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Little, B. R. (in press-d). Personality psychology: Havings, doings and beings in context. In S. Davis & J. Halonen (Eds.), *The many faces of psychology in the twenty first century.* Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Little, B. R., Lecci, L., & Watkinson, B. (1992). Personality and personal projects: Linking Big Five and PAC units of analysis. *Journal of Personality, 60,* 501–525.

Lomasky, L. E. (1984). Personal projects as the foundation of human rights. *Social Philosophy and Policy, 1,* 35–55.

Lomasky, L. E. (1987). *Persons, rights and the moral community.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Lydon, J. E., & Zanna, M. P. (1990). Commitment in the face of adversity: A value-affirmation approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58,* 1040–1047.

Markus, H. & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. *American Psychologist, 41,* 954–969.

McAdams, D. P. (1995). What do we know when we know a person? *Journal of Personality, 63,* 365–396.

McGregor, I., & Little, B. R. (1998). Personal projects, happiness and meaning: On doing well and being yourself. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,* 494–512.

Mischel, W. (1968). *Personality and assessment.* New York: Wiley.

Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1998). Reconciling processing dynamics and personality dispositions. *Annual Review of Psychology, 49,* 229–258.

Murray, H. A. (1938). *Explorations in personality.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1987). Sex differences in uni-polar depression: Evidence and theory. *Psychological Bulletin, 101,* 259–282.

Norem, J. (1989). Cognitive strategies as personality: Effectiveness, specificity, flexibility, and change (pp. 45–60). In D. Buss & N. Cantor (Eds.), *Personality psychology: Recent trends and emerging directions.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986). Defensive pessimism: "Harnessing" anxiety as motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,* 1208–1217.

Ogilvie, M. D., & Rose, K. M. (1996). Self-with-other representations and a taxonomy of motives: Two approaches to studying persons. *Journal of Personality, 63*(3), 633–679.

Omodei, M. M., & Wearing, A. J. (1990). Need satisfaction and involvement in personal projects: Toward an integrative model of subjective well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59* (4), 762–769.

Palys, T. S., & Little, B. R. (1983). Perceived life satisfaction and the organization of personal projects systems. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44,* 1221–1230..

Pervin, L. A. (1983). The stasis and flow of behavior: Toward a theory of goals. In M. M. Page (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (Vol. 31, pp. 1–53). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Pervin, L. A. (1985). Personality: Current controversies, issues, and directions. *Annual Review of Psychology, 36,* 83–114.

Pervin, L. A. (Ed.). (1989). *Goal concepts in personality and social psychology.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Phillips, S. D., Little, B. R., & Goodine, L. A.(1996). *Organizational climate and personal projects: Gender differences in the public service.* Ottawa, ON: Canadian Centre for Management Development.

Phillips, S. D., Little, B. R., & Goodine, L. A. (1997). Reconsidering gender and public administration: Five steps beyond conventional research. *Canadian Public Administration, 40,* 563–581.

Pychyl, T. (1995). *Personal projects, subjective well-being and the lives of doctoral students.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario.

Pychyl, T., & Little, B. R. (1998). Dimensional specificity in the prediction of well-being: Personal projects in pursuit of the Ph.D. *Social Indicators Research, 45,* 423–473.

Ruehlman, L. S., & Wolchik, S. A. (1988). Personal goals and interpersonal support and hindrance as factors in psychological distress and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55,* 293–301.

Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. (1998). The contours of positive human health. *Psychological Inquiry, 9,* 1–28.

Salmela-Aro, K. (1992). Struggling with self: The personal projects of students seeking psychological counselling. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 33,* 330–338.

Salmela-Aro, K., & Nurmi, J. (1996). Depressive symptoms and personal project appraisals: A cross-lagged longitudinal study. *Personality and Individual Differences, 21,* 373–381.

Sheldon, K. M., & Elliot, A. (1998). Not all personal goals are personal. Comparing autonomous and controlled reasons for goals as predictors of effort and attainment. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24,* 546–557.

Sheldon, K. M., & Elliot, A. J. (1999). Goal striving, need satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: The self-concordance model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76,* 482–497.

Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (1995). Coherence and congruence: Two aspects of personality integration.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 531–543.

Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (1998). Pursuing personal goals: Skills enable progress but not all progress is beneficial. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24,* 1319–1331.

Snyder, M. (1993). Basic research and practical problems: The promise of a "functional" personality and social psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19,* 251–264.

Sundberg, N. D. (1980). Assessment of persons. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects of mindset on positive illusions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69,* 213–226.

Toulmin, S. (1970). Reasons and causes. In R. Borger & F. Cioffi (Eds.). *Explanation in the behavioural sciences* (pp. 1–26) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Trianosky, G. (1990). Natural affection and responsibility for character: A critique of Kantian views of the virtues. In O. Flanagan & A. O. Rorty (Eds.), *Identity, character, and morality: Essays in moral psychology* (pp. 93–109). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Vallerand, R. (1997). Toward a hierarchical model of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 271–360). New York: Academic Press.

Vallerand, R. J., Fortier, M. S., & Guay, F. (1997). Self-determination and persistence in a real-life setting: Toward a motivational model of high-school dropout. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72,* 1161–1176.

White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. *Psychological Review, 66,* 297–333.

Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1982). Symbolic self-completion. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Williams, B. (1981). *Moral luck.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, D. A. (1990). *Personal project dimensions and perceived life satisfaction: A quantitative synthesis.* Unpublished master's thesis, Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario.

Wilson, E. O. (1998). *Consilience: The unity of knowledge.* New York: Knopf.

Winter, D. G. (1996). *Personality: Analysis and interpretation of lives.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Chapte

Emoi

Emotions
it's hard tc
no love w
when we
no amuse.
stories of (
ment whe
ing a colle
tion of the
beyond ar
things anc
significanc
tive" (Jam
world wou
along aim
impulses t
pursuits.

The ide
from new.
considered
the central
cept psych
sidered er
difficult tc
1994, p. 1
they have
deed, whe
tion, it ty｜